In this paper, I derive a structural econometric model of learning by doing from a dynamic oligopoly game. Unlike previous empirical models, this model is capable of testing hypotheses concerning both the technological nature and behavioral implications of learning. I estimate the model with firm level data from the early U.S. rayon industry. The empirical results show that there were considerable differences across firms in both proprietary and spillover learning. The results also indicate that two of the three firms took their rival's reactions into account when choosing their strategies.
or conclusions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Census Bureau.
I. INTRODUCTION
Learning by doing introduces an intertemporal dimension to a firm's output strategy. Current production adds to the firm's stock of experience. Increases in the firm's stock of experience lower its unit costs in future periods. If the firm's experience is completely proprietary, its optimal strategy is to overproduce in early periods in order to invest in future cost reduction.
This suggests that incumbent firms can exploit the learning curve to gain an absolute cost advantage over potential entrants and erect entry barriers. However, the incentive to overproduce diminishes if the firm's rivals learn from its experience via spillovers. First, authors invariably assume that spillover benefits accrue to firms in an industry equally. In the next section, I
discuss several reasons why it is unlikely that this would occur in actual industries. Imposing spillover symmetry has two disadvantages. The first is that a lot of potentially interesting information about the pattern of learning in the industry is lost. The second is more problematic. In many cases, cost data with which to estimate learning parameters are not available. A solution used in some previous studies is to assume that price-cost margins are constant over time and use price as a proxy for unit costs in learning regressions. If experience is a pure public good, theory suggests this assumption is appropriate. If not, the relationship between unit costs and price is unclear. In this case, the researcher must model the process that generated the observed market prices before drawing any inferences about the nature of learning in the industry.
The second shortcoming in the existing empirical literature is the failure of authors to examine the behavioral implications of learning. Theoretical research shows that learning has important consequences for firm behavior. However, there is no empirical evidence with which to answer the question; do firms take the dynamic effects of learning into account when choosing their output strategies? The answer has important consequences for how economists model learning by doing.
To overcome these shortcomings, I construct a structural model of dynamic nonprice competition which incorporates learning by doing. I estimate the model with firm level data from the early U.S. rayon industry. The framework employed is similar to that used by Roberts and Samuelson (1988) to examine advertising in the cigarette industry. The model extends the growing empirical literature in industrial organization that seeks to explain competition in oligopolistic industries (see Bresnahan [1989] and Geroski [1988] for reviews of this literature).
In the next section, I review some background issues. In section III, I briefly discuss some important features of the early rayon industry that aid in constructing the model in section IV. In section V, I discuss the data and estimation procedure. The estimation results are provided in section VI.
Finally, summary and conclusions are given in section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In his seminal paper, Wright (1936) employed the now common log-linear specification of the learning curve with cumulative production as his index of experience to examine airframe production. He found a significant negative relationship between average direct man-hour costs and the cumulative number of airframes produced. Subsequent authors from diverse disciplines have tested the reliability and generality of Wright's findings.
Important contributions in the economics literature include Alchian (1963) , Rapping (1965) and Sheshinski (1967) . The work of the Boston Consulting Group in the early 1970's did much to popularize the concept of learning by doing.
More recently, Lieberman (1982 Lieberman ( , 1984 
III. THE AMERICAN RAYON INDUSTRY: 1911-1938
In this section, I briefly describe the American rayon industry from its beginning to the years just preceding the second world war. In this discussion, I focus on several important structural and behavioral characteristics of the industry. I later exploit these characteristics to formulate a model of the industry. Avram (1929) , U.S. Tariff Commission (1944), Markham (1952) and Coleman (1969) provide more detailed analyses of the industry.
A. Structural Features of the Early Rayon Industry
Rayon is the generic term describing synthetic textile fibers produced from cellulose. Rayon was the first synthetic textile fiber developed and put into commercial production. period, the two largest firms (A.V.C. and DuPont) never accounted for less than half of U.S. rayon production and the market share of the smallest 21 firms never exceeded 10%.
The rayon industry is often cited as an example of a homogeneous good oligopoly. Markham (1952, p.1) Also, it was standard practice in the industry to convert yarns of varying sizes and strengths to a common yarn to facilitate market analysis. The trade press published price and output data for this standardized yarn.
Learning by doing is likely to be most important in the early stages of an industry's development. Although they perform no formal econometric tests, previous authors suggest that learning by doing was an important feature of the early rayon industry. Hollander (1965) Rayon producers did not appear to engage in vigorous inter-firm nonprice competition. Rather, they employed strategic variables, such as advertising and research and development, in a joint effort, to compete against rival textile fibers. According to Markham, Early consumer resistance to a synthetic substitute for silk and cotton, attributable in part to adverse publicity, provided rayon producers with a common enemy. By the late twenties they had jointly launched several organizations and associations for purposes of advertising, chemical research, and promulgation of information of interest to the industry. Such common interests could not be best served by complete arms' length competition [1952, p.3] .
Promotional activities were generally intended to have industry wide rather than firm specific effects. Furthermore, due to the similarity in the price and quality of rayon yarn offered by the various producers, advertising probably would have been an ineffective tool of inter-firm competition. Finally, the close proximity of the rayon firms and the well developed industry press and trade associations likely made it difficult for individual producers to appropriate all the benefits of their research and development activities.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF THE RAYON INDUSTRY
The last section suggests a strategy for modelling the early U.S. rayon industry. First, from the discussion of its structural features, it is reasonable to model the rayon industry as an oligopoly for a homogeneous product. The behavioral features of the industry suggest that rayon producers did not engage in vigorous inter-firm price competition. Nor did they appear to compete against each other via nonprice variables such as advertising or research and development. Instead, rayon producers employed pricing, advertising and research strategies jointly to position the industry more advantageously against competing textile fibers such as silk, cotton and wool. Finally, early rayon producers likely benefitted from learning by doing.
Therefore, for modelling purposes, I assume the rayon industry is an oligopoly for a homogeneous good in which firms engage in quantity competition. Further, I assume that output strategies have intertemporal effects via learning by doing.
Unlike the reduced form model employed by Lieberman the structural model described below requires no restrictions on the nature of the price-cost margins. I derive pricing relations directly from a dynamic theoretical oligopoly model. These contain expressions for marginal cost which are sufficiently general to test for spillover learning and whether learning benefits accrue to firms symmetrically as assumed in previous studies.
A. Theoretical Model
Competition in an industry characterized by learning by doing can be modelled as a dynamic game. Assume that there are n firms and T discrete time periods. At the beginning of each period, firms choose quantities of a homogeneous output, q .
Firm i's costs in period t, C (q ,W ,X ), are a function of it it it t current output, input prices and the experience vector, X . In t this paper, I index experience with cumulative production. Thus, firm i's stock of experience at time t is x = ' q which it s=1 is t yields the industry experience vector X = (x ) . Output
n choices play an additional role as investments in experience.
The more output produced today, the lower unit costs will be tomorrow. The objective of each firm is to choose values of q it to maximize where q = ' q is industry output, Q = (q ) is the
n n industry output vector and P(q ) is the industry inverse demand t function. The term * is a discount factor.
If firms move simultaneously à la Cournot, the necessary conditions for a closed-loop Nash equilibrium are for all i = 1,...,n and t = 1,...,T. The first term in brackets is the standard first order condition from the "static" problem with no learning. Learning by doing, however, creates an explicit intertemporal link between the strategies firms employ today and the competitive environment in which they find themselves tomorrow. The first line of (3) gives the direct effect of the firm's output choices on its payoffs. The second line shows the strategic effect. This arises from the intertemporal nature of the strategies due to learning by doing.
When learning is proprietary, q and q (s>t and j…i) will be it js strategic substitutes and incumbent firms may, by overinvesting in experience, erect entry barriers (see Tirole [1988] and Spence [1981] ). Spillovers imply that q and q will be strategic 6 it js complements and that the ability of incumbents to deter entry by accumulating experience is reduced.
B. Econometric Specification
The Structure must also be placed on the dynamic effects (6)
contained in the first order conditions. The model would be overparameterized if all the terms which measure these effects were to be estimated. Following Roberts and Samuelson (1988) , I
capture all dynamic effects which occur two or more periods into the future via a firm specific constant. Namely,
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I also specify the following behavioral parameter for each 
V. DATA AND ESTIMATION
To estimate the model, I have assembled a data set covering the first 28 years of rayon production in the U.S.
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The sample was cut off at 1938 because the World War II seriously disrupted the textile markets, and I could not obtain all the necessary data for any post war years. Furthermore, the importance of learning by doing as a factor in the rayon industry likely diminished by this time. The pricing relations (9) are written in implicit form, so I use the NL3SLS estimator due to Gallant and Jorgenson (1977 estimates.
To test parameter restrictions in this model, I employ the T test statistic developed by Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) . Realizing this, the smaller firms behave strategically by reducing their output rates to prevent others from free riding on their experience while they free ride on A.V.C.'s experience.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are two important shortcomings in the empirical literature on learning by doing. First, spillovers are invariably assumed to benefit all firms in an industry symmetrically. However, the ability of individual firms to learn from rival experience is likely to differ due to firm specific characteristics such as location, training programs and research and development expenditures. Second, the empirical literature fails to examine the behavioral implications of learning. In this paper, I develop and estimate an empirical model which addresses these shortcomings.
I derive the structural model presented in the paper from a dynamic oligopoly game. It allows tests of hypotheses concerning both the technological nature and behavioral implications of learning by doing. I estimate the model with firm level data from the early U.S. rayon industry. I find evidence of both proprietary and spillover learning. Also, the ability to learn from both own and rival experience differed across firms.
The estimated behavioral parameters were significant and of the expected sign for 2 of the 3 firms. That is, they were aware of the intertemporal consequences of their strategies and altered their behavior accordingly. Surprisingly, the behavioral coefficient for the "dominant" firm, A.V.C., was not statistically significant. However, when put in the context of the situation faced by the early industry the fact that A.V.C.
appeared to have ignored rival reactions makes sense. Namely, the rayon industry was competing against the natural fibers in an effort to get a foothold in the larger textile fiber market. If A.V.C. was focusing its competitive efforts towards increasing rayon's share of the textile fiber market and not its own share of the rayon market, as the discussion in section 3 suggests, then this finding is logical. 
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